Government depends on collective decision making. Even in peaceful democracies, some decide for all. The author challenges the morality of this position. It is not different political systems that are at fault as the nature of politics itself.

Ownership is a relation with characteristics that force society to function more effectively and that make property a target of much hostility. Among the intellectual enemies of property, Locke is arguably the most influential. His “enough and as good left for others” condition, that he believed to be easily satisfied, was a failed attempt morally to justify property. Instead, it succeeded in undermining its legitimacy. Hume identified the existence of a convention,—in today's language, a Nash-equilibrium—which, being wholly voluntary and ageless, (...) has attractive moral qualities besides ensuring the “stability of possession”. A recent attack against the “myth of property” by Murphy and Nagel is guided by an erroneous understanding of the nature of conventions. Footnotes1 A three-part essay of the author, under the same title, treating the subject somewhat differently, has been published in August-September 2003 online in the ‘Library of Economics and Liberty’ of Liberty Fund. (shrink)

Ownership is a relation with characteristics that force society to function more effectively and that make property a target of much hostility. Among the intellectual enemies of property, Locke is arguably the most influential. His “enough and as good left for others” condition, that he believed to be easily satisfied, was a failed attempt morally to justify property. Instead, it succeeded in undermining its legitimacy. Hume identified the existence of a convention,—in today's language, a Nash-equilibrium—which, being wholly voluntary and ageless, (...) has attractive moral qualities besides ensuring the “stability of possession”. A recent attack against the “myth of property” by Murphy and Nagel is guided by an erroneous understanding of the nature of conventions. (shrink)

Why, despite its recognized perverse effects, do societies opt for an expanding welfare state? Public choice theory accounts for this in terms of the prevailing choice rule, ?majoritarian?; democracy. This contractarian perspective holds that other, more benign choice rules could be adopted. The reviewer disputes this view on the ground that if the public choice approach is generalized, the choice rule must be seen to be the product of the same influences as the choices within the rule. ?Majoritarian?; democracy maximizes (...) the scope for redistributive legislation, hence also the expected gains front politics; it will be ?chosen?; in preference to more benign rules. (shrink)

Most social institutions are supposed to be relatively benign, so that if they did not exist, rational human beings would find it worthwhile to create them. It is comforting to believe that we have the social institutions we wish to have, and we wish to have them because they enhance the common good. The article claims that this belief is in some important cases either a self-delusion or a pious lie. The classic example is the state. We are taught that (...) since it is necessary for efficient social coexistence, it should be regarded as if it were the result of a social contract we have voluntarily entered into. The law-and-economics school generalizes this type of approach in explaining customs and law. Customs and laws evolve in response to needs. They are what they are because they efficiently serve some purpose. Certain primitive customs are rationalized in this way. The article claims that some of these rationalizations are grossly implausible. One primitive custom, reciprocal gift-giving and hospitality, is alleged to be a mutual insurance scheme, an allegation there are strong reasons to doubt. This custom, then, is said to be the ancestor of the modern welfare state. Both the ancient custom and its modern equivalent are efficient because mutual insurance that redistributes risk is itself efficient. The article demonstrates that mutual insurance and the welfare state are different in essential respects, and the legitimising analogy is false. (shrink)

The paper criticises a number of accounts of freedom, including those which analyse freedom in terms of affording individuals ever widening opportunities, those which mistake liberties for rights and those which identify freedoms with duties imposed on others. All these inflated notions of freedom are liable to produce a shrinkage of of freedom in its basic sense of referring to areas of life in which there are rules preventing others from interfering with individuals or groups in doing things which are (...) feasible for them. (shrink)

George Stigler soutenait que l’économiste, quand il prêchait, ne pouvait faire plus que de recommander une éthique de la rationalité instrumentale, ou de la manière intelligente d’accorder les moyens aux fins. Les fins les plus importantes appartiendraient toutes à un maximande unique, la richesse, tempérée par un altruisme de proximité.L’agnosticisme moral radical de Stigler le conduisit à nier toute distinction entre les choix forcés et libres, les actes licites et illicites, le vol et le commerce dans la mesure où ils (...) aboutissaient de manière égale à l’augmentation de l’utilité. En considérant que le concept de coercition était sans fondement, il identifia la liberté avec la richesse. Cet article expose les raisons analytiques pour lesquelles les arguments de Stigler ne sont pas valables.George Stigler held that the economist, when he preached, could do no more than commend an ethic of instrumental rationality, the intelligent fitting of means to ends. The ends that mattered were all included in a single maximand, wealth, tempered by proximity-altruism.Stigler’s radical moral agnosticism led him to deny any distinction between coerced and free choices, licit and illicit acts, robbery and commerce as long as they were equally utilityenhancing. Finding the concept of coercion baseless, he identified liberty with wealth. The paper furnishes analytical reasons why Stigler’s arguments are invalid. (shrink)

In a recent essay Robert Sugden sets out his view that two foundational institutions of the social order, the convention and the social contract (at least in one variant of the latter) are compatible and that therefore it is not self-contradictory to be a Humean and a contractarian at the same time.¹ The proposition, despite appearances, has greater practical importance than most other doctrinal ones tend to do for if widely conceded, it would render current political thought even more woolly (...) than it is already. If so, a critical scrutiny might be of some use. (shrink)